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Abstract 
Education impacts the economy through a range of channels. The extent to which 
these have been analysed is inversely correlated with how difficult they are to 
quantify. For instance, it is thoroughly documented how the education sector 
impacts the economy through purchases of inputs and employing staff. Conversely, 
it is far less well understood how education detracts from (costly) criminal 
behaviour, although recent work is making impressive strides in this direction. The 
salient topic of how skills benefit the economy has been widely researched but 
arguable the implications of that evidence base are not widely understood. 
Analysing education's contribution to the economy is faced with two main 
challenges: the limitations of traditional national accounting, i.e. how to 
incorporate impacts that occur outside the formal marketplace; and the statistical 
challenge of unravelling the specific contribution of education from the various 
confounders. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The application of economic analysis to various aspects of education dates back at 
least to the work of Adam Smith1 who recognised the skills of the population2 as 
one of the manifestations of an economy’s capital stock. The modern literature on 
the economics of education as a special sub-field spans approximately half a 
century (De Meulemeester & Diebolt, 2004), stretching back to Schultz (1961) who 
argued for public intervention to facilitate human capital accumulation and Becker 
(1964), who presented a model of investment in human capital analogous to 
investment in physical capital. Since then the field has grown to include a huge 
literature encompassing broad topics ranging from the role of education in 
influencing economy-wide outcomes, such as in economic growth and 
development; labour market outcomes and the functioning of school systems and 
individual institutions3. How much, if any, role economic perspectives should have 
in shaping education policy is beyond this chapter to resolve. However, there is 
significant evidence to suggest that education policy will always have economic 
implications, whether intended or not. 
 
The economics of education is not a unified body of knowledge, but rather one that 
is spread across time and several sub-disciplines of economics. For this overview I 
shall build on McMahon's taxonomy of identifying impacts along the two 
dimensions of private/public and market/non-market. The main emphasis is on the 
labour market impacts of qualifications. This is by far the most widely researched 
aspect of the economic impact of education. Then I shall examine how this 
translates into a macroeconomic impact in the context of human capital and 
signalling theories; and job queuing. Furthermore, the chapter examines the wider 
economic impacts of education, such as through impacts on health, crime and 
household production. Where appropriate I shall highlight tensions between 
popular perception and the evidence base and point out areas for further research.  
 
As is common in applied research the evidence base on the economic impact of 
education falls short of some of the detailed requirements of the decisions facing 
policy makers. Empirical evidence relies primarily on observational data, which for 
                                                     
1 De Meulemeester and Diebolt (2004) suggest early precedents can be found in the work of 
William Petty but that Smith was the first clearly to articulate the concept of human capital. 
2 “the acquired and useful abilities of all the inhabitants or members of the society. The 
acquisition of such talents, by the maintenance of the acquirer during his education, study, or 
apprenticeship, always costs a real expense, which is a capital fixed and realized, as it were, in his 
person. Those talents, as they make a part of his fortune, so do they likewise of that of the society 
to which he belongs“ (Smith, 1776, book II, ch.1, para. 17). 
3 See for example Johnes & Johnes (2004) for an overview of different strands of education 
economics. 
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causal inference requires more elaborate identification strategies such as natural 
experiments. Furthermore, the level of detail is often limited by the nature of the 
data collected and statistical power. For instance, information on the association 
between the level of qualifications and labour market outcomes are available for 
most countries. But digging deeper such as into subject of study, type of education 
institutions attended, regional or socioeconomic variation, evidence rapidly 
becomes more difficult to obtain. Conversely, many aspects of the economic impact 
of education that are well supported empirically do not appear to be widely 
accepted or understood. The aim of this chapter is to offer an accessible 
introduction to empirical work on the economic impact of education. 
 
Before digging into the actual evidence it is useful to clarify what is meant, when 
referring to economic impact. Therefore, I shall briefly define two concepts that 
typically lurk in the background of any discussion of the economic implications of 
policy, National Accounting and its result the Gross Domestic Product, and Cost 
Benefit Analysis (CBA).  
2 How do we define "the economy"? 
It is frequently asserted in public-policy discourse that a particular course of events 
would be good or bad for the economy. Sometimes the direction and/or magnitude 
of this impact is contested, but despite the definitive article this reference to "the 
economy" is rarely clarified. Does it refer to a conceptual notion of the economy; a 
particular metric, such as GDP or employment; or perhaps the interests of a 
particular sub-population such as rentiers or wage earners? Furthermore, is the 
definition restricted to market based activity, which can be clearly attributed a 
monetary value or does it also account for a wider range of impacts, such as on 
leisure, home-production or the environment? 
 
A clear delimitation of some of these boundaries is still a work in progress (for a 
comprehensive discussion see Stiglitz, Sen & Fitoussi, 2010). However, two 
yardsticks are often applied in the evaluation of the economic merits of public 
policy. One is the contribution of policy to macroeconomic aggregates (GDP, GNP, 
etc) as defined by national accounting. The other is the sum of total costs and total 
benefits as articulated in Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA).  
 
Modern national accounting took hold in the 1940's and has evolved through 
successive revisions of the United Nations System of National Accounts, although 
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the precursors date back to the 17th century4. In a nutshell, the national accounts 
count the amount of output, income and expenditures of households, government 
and businesses for a particular place over a particular period at market prices. One 
of the results of this exercise are frequently referenced macroeconomic aggregates. 
Gross Domestic Product or GDP (expenditure view) is defined as the total market 
value of all final goods and services produced within an economy5. GDP (income 
view) can also be defined as the total factor incomes (wages and other value added) 
generated in the economy6.  
 
From the definition of GDP the limitations of the concept are clear. It is a measure 
based on aggregate market activity and therefore has little to offer on non-market 
issues or the composition of the aggregate. As Okun (1971, p. 133) points out, the 
“beauty of the present practice is that no sensible person could seriously mistake 
the GNP for [a measure of social welfare]“. However, an increase in GDP or GNP is 
often interpreted as a proxy for much broader advancement. A comprehensive 
review of these issues is presented in Stiglitz, Sen & Fitoussi (2010), which bring 
together discussion of the "classical" measurement issues associated with GDP and 
GNP, in addition to environmental issues and the more philosophical of defining 
and measuring quality of life.  
 
As useful as national accounting principles are when applied to their intended 
domain, these clearly omit important aspects of what is sought after in public 
policy. Public services are counted in GDP at their input costs, but not their output 
value. This can provide a very misleading target for establishing policy priorities as 
simply the most expensive policy would contribute the most to GDP7. Economic 
benefits of education, such as a skilled workforce, impact through contributing to 
the activity of all the sectors in the economy8.  
                                                     
4 As Bos (1992) points out the impetus for articulating the amount of economic activity was 
provided by the needs of England and France to levy taxes in order to pay for war and other 
activities of the state. 
5 The small qualification of ‘final’ is important in this context as by this GDP cancels out the double 
counting that occurs where the output of a sector is used as an intermediate input as products and 
services move between producers in the supply chain. 
6 A closely related concept is the Gross National Product (GNP), which adjusts GDP for net 
payments abroad. GNP therefore represents only activity attributable to the citizens of a particular 
country (whether home or abroad) whereas GPD counts economic activity within a particular 
place, whether attributable to domestic or foreign subjects. 
7 However, such boosts to economic activity can be important, particularly in a local context, and 
no doubt play a role in the overall policy setting. See for instance Hermannsson et al (2014) for an 
analysis of the contribution of higher education to the GDP of Scotland. 
8 To capture these effects research have used simulation models to estimate the impact of 
education outputs on the macro economy. Hermannsson et al (2014) estimate the contribution of 
skilled labour from higher education in Scotland and Hermannsson, Lecca & Swales (2014) 
estimate the contribution of a single graduation cohort from Scottish Further Education Colleges. 
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Arguably the most prevalent approach for establishing the economic merits of 
policy is Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA). Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is widely used to 
derive an estimate of the social net-benefit of public projects by enumerating and 
evaluating the total social costs and total social benefits. To this end a range of 
methods and rules are applied.  
 
CBA is a bottom up approach which includes identifying the relevant costs and 
benefits (including externalities), assigning each a monetary value and applying an 
appropriate discount rate to derive a present value of future cost and benefit 
streams9. As with any method in applied economics each of these steps requires 
careful consideration and should not be treated as a mechanical exercise. Costs and 
benefits have to be identified so that there is neither under- nor over attribution of 
costs or benefits to the activity being evaluated. Various techniques are used to 
assign prices depending on circumstance and available information and no single 
discount rate is universally appropriate or accepted. However, sensitivity analyses 
can be applied around critical parameters to produce a range of plausible 
outcomes. One of the benefits of CBA is that it is a well-established approach with 
well know qualities and limitations. If done in a transparent way users should be 
reasonably able to draw their own judgements as to the validity of assessment for 
the valuation of individual components and adjust their interpretation of 
conclusions accordingly. 
 
CBA approaches are outlined in the policy manuals of various governments and 
international organisations. For instance the UK's Green Book on Appraisal and 
Evaluation in Central Government10. Often in practice simplified routines are 
adopted for CBA, which are sanctioned by convention in the field of application. 
However at a more general level the methods involved raise some significant 
theoretical and practical challenges (for a comprehensive discussion see Layard & 
Glaister 1994). 
 
Typically it is straightforward to estimate the cost of education on the basis of 
accounting data. However, as we shall see, valuing the benefits is more challenging.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
Giesecke & Madden (2006) estimate the economy wide contribution of university research in 
Australia. 
9 CBA draws close parallels with investment appraisal in that the objective is to establish to what 
outlays are recouped over a particular time horizon. However, CBA allows for non-pecuniary 
benefits and costs as opposed to a sole focus on cash flow as is the case in conventional 
investment appraisal. 
10 For details see: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-green-book-appraisal-and-
evaluation-in-central-governent  
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3 Economic Impacts of Education: An overview 
 
Education policy impacts the economy through a wide range of channels. These 
vary in terms of their salience, clarity and depth of understanding. In its simplest 
incarnation education can be viewed as any other production sector, where 
education institutions purchase inputs and pay wages. Similarly students can be 
treated like tourists, affecting the economy through consumption expenditures. 
This is particularly relevant for higher education where students are mobile, 
concentrate in a few student centres and sometimes are a source of significant 
export earnings, as in the UK case11.These are referred to as demand-side or 
expenditure effects12.  
 
More fundamentally, qualified individuals directly stimulate the productive capacity 
(supply-side) of the economy through the skills they offer in the workplace, but also 
through a range of indirect effects. Furthermore, many of the benefits of education 
are non-pecuniary. In-order to classify these supply-side and wider impacts I follow 
McMahon (2009) in classifying these along two axes, private or public and market 
or non-market. This results in four categories (see Table 1): private market benefits, 
private non-market benefits, external market benefits and external non-market 
benefits.  
 
Private market benefits of education are the labour market benefits enjoyed by 
individuals as a result of their level of education. They manifest themselves in 
higher earnings and lower unemployment rates, relative to less qualified 
individuals. Similarly, private non-market impacts of education are the benefits 
enjoyed by individuals outside of the labour market that are directly attributable to 
their level of education. These include positive effects on health, longevity, 
happiness and many other benefits. These effects are strongly correlated with 
income and other attributes, which make it challenging to identify the specific 
contributions of education. 
 
Table 1 Classification of returns to education 
    Who benefits? 
    Private External 
                                                     
11 In 2013 The Department for Business Innovation and Skills announced a strategy to further 
increase the export of education services from the UK: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-push-to-grow-uks-175-billion-education-exports-
industry   
12 This literature has a long tradition. For an overview see Florax (1992) and Siegfried et al (2007). 
The methods of these studies are revisited by Hermannsson et al (2013, 2014) who allow for the 
influence of public funding constraints and compare the impacts of different institutions. 
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External impacts of education (or externalities) refer to benefits enjoyed by wider 
society as a result of the level of education of the general population. These 
externalities can be manifested in terms of higher wages and higher profits and are 
reflected in GDP per capita. However, they are not “internalised” by particular 
qualified individuals and are enjoyed by other agents in the economy. Examples 
would include the higher productivity and wages of non-graduates generated by 
working with graduates and the education system's (typically focussing on HEIs) 
contribution to R&D and innovation (of a public good nature).  
 
Similarly, external non-market impacts improve quality of life, but are not 
necessarily directly translatable into pecuniary benefits. Examples would include 
any education-induced: reduction in crime levels, improvements in public health, 
democratisation or political stability. These are non-monetary benefits that are 
captured at a social level as an indirect impact of the level of education in the 
community. They are not captured in measures of economic output but may 
improve other development indicators. This category would include education’s 
contributions to various types of social advancement, such as the quality of culture 
or the rule of law, as reflected in quality of life metrics, for example happiness 
scales (independent of the effects of income on the same metrics to avoid double 
counting).  
 
It is apparent that accurately attributing these effects to their source is challenging. 
Often outcomes are difficult to measure, random assignment is usually not possible 
and there are various confounding factors that need to be taken into consideration. 
However, it is worthwhile attempting to clarify this inherently messy situation as 
the alternative of assuming these effects simply do not exist could lead to under 
investment in education that is harmful to society. 
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4 Labour market benefits of education for individuals (private-
market impacts) 
 
An extensive literature documents the labour market benefits of education 
(typically referred to as the returns to education) at various levels of schooling, in 
different countries at different times. Sometimes the results are further 
disaggregated by characteristics such as gender, discipline and social background. 
These studies reveal a clear correlation between education and income and provide 
rich information about the nature of this relationship. Due to an obvious inability to 
conduct controlled experiments in the field, verifying the causality between 
education and income has proven difficult. More recently a wealth of papers has 
been published utilising advanced statistical approaches, i.e. instrument variables, 
controlling for fixed effects (using samples of twins) and natural experiments, to 
clarify the issue. 
 
Numerous reviews of the microeconomic literature on returns to education have 
been published. Examples include Dickson & Harmon (2011), Checchi (2006), 
Blundell et al (2005), Psacharopoulos & Patrinos (2004, 2002), Harmon & Walker 
(2003) and Krueger & Lindahl (2001). Typically these estimates are obtained 
through regression analysis of cross-sectional data such as available for the UK in 
the Family Expenditure Survey, the General Household Survey and the Labour Force 
Survey (Blundell et al, 2005). An earning function (see Mincer 1974) is fitted where 
indicators for formal education, labour market experience and individual 
characteristics are used to explain wage income.  
 
Typically these studies find higher returns to education in lower income countries 
where education levels are generally lower. This is seen as consistent with the 
notion of diminishing returns to education, with the return to education falling as 
the average education levels rise. However as noted in section 4.4 the dynamism of 
these diminishing returns is more complex than a simple analysis of increasing 
supply within a comparative static framework might suggest, as it is not only the 
supply of education that can change but the demand for it as well.  
4.1 Returns to education in the UK 
A large body of statistical work examines the labour market benefits of education in 
high income countries. In the remainder of this section I shall focus on the UK and 
UK-regions, but a wealth of evidence is available for other countries (for an 
overview see Psacharopoulos & Patrinos (2004, 2002)). 
 
A key result, repeatedly found in studies of this kind is that; qualifications increase 
the likelihood of employment and more qualified workers generally earn higher 
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wages. For example, Walker & Zhu (2007ab) pool ten years of data from the Labour 
Force Surveys in 1996-2005 to construct a large enough sample to estimate wage 
premia by qualification level at a regional level within Great Britain. Their broad 
findings are in line with other work in the field. For both men and women they find 
the value of qualifications broadly similar across Great Britain. To demonstrate the 
stylised findings I shall focus on results for Scotland. 
 
Walker & Zhu (2007ab) find strong wage premia effects for both vocational and 
academic qualifications13. Overall the academic qualifications yield a higher wage 
premia but what is also noteworthy is how the structure of the wage premium by 
levels of qualification differs between vocational and academic qualifications. The 
marginal effect of low level vocational qualifications is modest vis-á-vis low level 
academic qualifications, whereas the additional wage premia gained by 
postgraduate study is modest. From a human capital perspective these findings may 
not be surprising if the amount of schooling behind these education levels is 
examined. For example a Level 4 undergraduate degree typically takes four 
academic years to complete, whereas a common duration for masters degrees is 12 
months14 so the wage premia earned per effective duration of study (and therefore 
also the return to education) is broadly similar between Level 4 and Level 5. 
 
Table 2 Hourly wage premium of vocational and academic qualifications in Scotland. Source:  Walker & 
Zhu (2007b). 
 
Vocational wage 
premium 
Male Male  
[cumulative] 
Female Female 
[Cumulative] 
None Base Base Base Base 
Level 1 9% 9% 11% 11% 
Level 2 7% 16% 9% 20% 
Level 3 19% 35% 9% 29% 
Level 4 17% 52% 23% 52% 
Above level 4 30% 82% 29% 81% 
     
Academic wage 
premium 
Male Male  
[cumulative] 
Female Female 
[Cumulative] 
None Base Base Base Base 
Level 1 17% 17% 18% 18% 
Level 2 12% 29% 12% 30% 
Level 3 19% 48% 13% 43% 
Level 4 31% 79% 34% 77% 
Above level 4 12% 91% 13% 90% 
  
                                                     
13 For vocational qualifications they use standard classification from 'Level 1' (lowest) to 'Above 
level 4' (highest) as found in the National Vocational Qualifications (NVQ). Although an official 
equivalent ranking does not exist for academic qualifications labour market researchers have 
established conventions as to equivalent ranking of academic qualifications. 
14 Presumably respondents with masters degrees dominate the sample as the PhD graduates are 
less common. 
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Table 3 Examples of SVQ/NVQ Levels. Source: Walker & Zhu (2007b). 
 
SVQ/NVQ 
level Academic qualification Vocations qualification 
5 PhD, Masters degree 
PGCE, Non-masters 
postgraduate quals 
4 Undergraduate degree HNC/HND 
3 2+ A-levels/3+Highers OND, ONC 
2 
5+ GCSEs at A-C, 'O' Grades, 
Credit Standard Grade 
GSVQ/NVQ intermediate, 
RSA diploma 
1 
<5 GCSE, General Standard 
Grade 
BTEC, SCOTVEC first or 
general cert 
 
 
4.2 Returns to education by subject  
A perennial question is whether the returns to education differ between subjects. 
Strong views on this can be found in popular perception, but a rigorous quantitative 
confirmation of differing returns to subjects is harder to provide. The key limitation 
for statistical estimates is the size of the samples available. Blundell et al (2000) 
report some individual subject findings for higher education graduates in the UK 
based on the National Child Development Survey, which tracks a cohort of people 
born in 1958. For most subjects differences were found to be insignificant. For men 
a significant negative effect was found for biology, chemistry, environmental 
sciences and geography. The returns are calculated based on comparing the 
earnings of university graduates, with the earnings of those with sufficient 
qualifications to enter university. Therefore a weak return reflects the relatively 
weak earnings power of a particular subject, but are also influenced by the earning 
power of non-graduates. For women the pattern is somewhat different, as they 
were found to earn higher returns in education, economics, accountancy and law, 
and an ‘other social sciences’ category. To control for the quality of the student 
intake into the subjects they included A-level results in their regressions. Inclusion 
of this variable did not alter the results qualitatively. 
 
O’Leary & Sloan (2005) analyse returns to higher education degree subjects. To 
obtain a sufficiently large sample for this breakdown they pool observations from 
the Labour Force Survey from 1994 to 2002. Examining men, for undergraduate 
degrees they find the lowest wage premium accrues to holders of arts degrees, -
2.5% vis-á-vis those who have completed two A-levels15. Based on an earnings index 
where earnings of Arts degree holders (including performance arts) were fixed at 
                                                     
15 The negative wage premia for men‘s arts degrees is striking as it suggests these individuals 
might have been better off in monetary terms from entering the labour market after completing 
secondary school. However, the converse applies to women with arts degrees who earn positive 
wage premia. 
11 
 
100 the highest wage premia accrue to accountancy, medicine, engineering and 
maths and computing (>130). Next in line (130>125) are law, business and finance 
and education, followed by geography and architecture (125>120). Lower wage 
premia (120>110) are earned in nursing, biology, psychology, other social sciences, 
English, history and languages. Interestingly no subject falls in the range between 
100 and 110, implying there is a significant jump in wage premia from holding an 
arts degree to the next tier above. 
 
 
Table 4 Index number of returns to narrow first degree subjects for men and women: Based on several 
waves of the Labour Force Survey (1994Q1-2002Q4). Source: O'Leary & Sloane (2005) Tables 7 & 8, pp. 82-
83. 
 Men  Women 
 n 
index 
no SE rank  n index no SE rank 
Medicine and related 336 132.06+ 0.0474 5   597 127.52+ 0.0305 2 
Nursing 25 114.39+ 0.0358 20  220 113.93+ 0.0301 9 
Sciences 1327 125.22+ 0.0335 12  696 106.13+ 0.0261 17 
Biology 130 115.87+ 0.0482 18  188 101.6 0.0356 22 
Psychology 125 118.66+ 0.0454 17  303 101.98 0.0262 21 
Geography 298 123.42+ 0.0477 13  261 104.34 0.0398 19 
Maths and computing 975 137.23+ 0.031 3  346 118.10+ 0.037 7 
Engineering and technology 650 131.85+ 0.0313 6  97 113.54+ 0.0556 12 
Civil engineering 411 129.25+ 0.0325 7  24 113.7 0.095 11 
Mechanical engineering 524 133.71+ 0.0339 4  19 113.84+ 0.0286 10 
Electrical engineering 682 140.73+ 0.0313 2  28 119.04+ 0.0233 5 
Architecture and related 410 120.97+ 0.0288 15  83 118.70+ 0.037 6 
Social sciences 132 114.20+ 0.0451 21  286 113.45+ 0.0313 13 
Sociology 126 110.83+ 0.0394 24  269 106.50+ 0.0292 16 
Politics 118 115.70+ 0.0477 19  72 99.09 0.0508 25 
Law 315 128.04+ 0.041 9  302 123.97+ 0.0372 3 
Business and financial studies 827 126.53+ 0.0266 11  691 114.34+ 0.0234 8 
Economics 430 128.57+ 0.0445 8  110 109.68++ 0.0508 14 
Accountancy 193 142.15+ 0.047 1  95 137.12+ 0.0504 1 
Arts 804 100 n.a. 25  1091 100 n.a. 24 
English 213 110.84+ 0.0423 23  468 106.65+ 0.0322 15 
History 306 111.69+ 0.041 22  318 110.95 0.0365 23 
Languages 110 119.22+ 0.054 16  291 103.3 0.0386 20 
Education 490 126.73+ 0.0316 10  1283 122.40+ 0.0223 4 
Combined 2529 122.41+ 0.0241 14   3135 105.58+ 0.0187 18 
Notes: All returns are measured relative to an arts degree (base = 100); return to an arts degree relative to 2+ 
A-levels is -3.25% (men) and 19.29% (women); +  (++) denotes a statistically significant difference in returns 
at the  95% (90%) confidence level; na denotes not applicable 
 
A different pattern emerges for women. Compared to those who have completed 
two A-levels, women earn significant wage premia on arts degrees (19.29%). Again, 
based on an earnings index where holders of arts degrees are set at 100, fewer of 
the subjects were found to earn a statistically significant wage premia vis-á-vis an 
arts degree. Of statistically significant differences the biggest wage premium for 
women is earned in accountancy (137). The next tier (130>120) is composed of 
12 
 
medicine, law and education. Many subjects fall on the range between 120 and 110, 
including nursing, maths and computing, engineering, architecture and business 
and financial studies. In the range closest to arts (110>100) we find sciences, 
sociology, economics and English.  
 
O’Leary & Sloan (2005) base the disaggregation of the subjects on what was 
feasible with the available data, with popular fields allowing more disaggregation 
due to larger samples. In their regressions they include a control for the quality of 
the student intake16. This affects the final ranking of the subjects; where a wage 
premium is reduced if a subject has a relatively high quality student intake, but 
inflated (in relative terms) if the student intake is of a relatively low quality. 
 
This issue is revisited by Walker & Zhu (2011) who find limited variation across 
subjects for women but a more pronounced effect for men, where law, economics 
and management offer the best financial outcome. Degree class has large effects in 
all subjects suggesting the possibility of large returns to effort. Similarly, 
postgraduate study has large effects, independently of first degree class. Chevalier 
(2011) argues that an overlooked aspect with regards to the economic pay-off from 
subject choice is the distribution of earnings around the mean. Graduates in some 
subjects exhibit earnings that are relatively tightly clustered around the mean. For 
example education and subjects allied to medicine where most graduates enter 
relatively centralised labour markets with formal pay-scales. Conversely, for some 
other subjects, outcomes are much more widely dispersed, making the subject 
choice more risky from an investment point of view.  
 
4.3 Interpreting the statistical association between education and 
earnings 
Whilst the correlation between earnings and education is a well-established fact, 
the presence of correlation is not sufficient to establish causality. There are two 
main theoretical perspecitves on this subject. The human capital school has its 
origins in the works of Mincer (1958), Schultz (1960) and Becker (1964). This 
tradition maintains that education is an investment in human capital, which in turn 
increases the productivity of workers. An alternative perspective is that of the 
signalling school. This stems from the works of Spence (1973) and Stiglitz (1975). In 
the most extreme version of this theory, education has no impact on productivity, 
but simply reveals (signals) innate ability to employers. A third alternative is the 
assignment approach, which explains the distribution of earnings as result of an 
optimising process, whereby workers are assigned to jobs in the labour market. For 
an overview, see Sattinger, (1993). This work has its origin in Tinbergen (1951, 
                                                     
16 Leslie’s degree acceptance quality variable see: O’Leary & Sloan, 2005, p. 77. 
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1956) and Roy (1951). These papers offer a general equilibrium framework, where 
demand factors play a role in determining the distribution of wages. A fourth view 
is that of Thurow (1975), where labour market rigidities create job queues and 
where education again acts only as a signal of a worker’s trainability. These models 
suggest that longer job queues disproportionately impact on less skilled workers, 
such as during a cyclical downturn, as is demonstrated by Ours & Ridder (1995). 
4.3.1 Signalling and screening 
An often raised concern is that education may have a value in the labour market 
not because of the positive effects of formal education upon productivity but for 
spurious reasons. Particularly it is stressed that education may act as a signal of 
ability or other characteristics that employers value but cannot easily observe. In 
the extreme case, these abilities are unaffected by education altogether. That is to 
say, education signals, but does not contribute to, the workers’ inherent 
productivity. As noted by Harmon & Walker (2003) there is a fundamental difficulty 
in unravelling the extent to which education is a signal of existing productivity or 
truly enhances productivity. This is because both human capital and signalling 
theories suggest that there is a positive correlation between earnings and 
education, but for very different reasons.  
 
Brown and Sessions (2004) refer to the theory which proclaims education ‘signals’ 
or ‘screens’ intrinsic productivity as the ‘sorting’ hypothesis. Signalling and 
screening refer to two related genres of models which describe this process from 
opposite starting points. Signalling models (Spence 1973, Arrow 1973) describe the 
process from the point of view of the employee obtaining a signal to enhance his 
labour market performance. Screening models turn the sequence around to have 
employers screening the labour market by setting a required signal their applicants 
need to obtain (Stiglitz, 1975). 
 
The models17 draw on the theoretical work on asymmetric information and market 
imperfections, where often a single transaction takes place between the buyer and 
the seller and therefore asymmetric information can be used to the sellers 
advantage18.However, an employment relationship is continuous and firms can 
revise their employment and wage decisions. Even if firms are paying their wages 
purely on the basis of credentials in the short run, over time they gather their own 
information about the employee and can change wages, through redundancy or 
promotion. Therefore under longer time horizons employers should correct for a 
potential initial effect of signalling. Indeed, examples of signalling models with 
                                                     
17 I shall not elaborate on the models here, but refer interested readers to Brown & Sessions 
(2004) and Checchi (2006).  
18 See Akerlof (1970). 
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employer learning can be found in contemporary work, for example Lange & Topel 
(2006). Furthermore, for a review of empirical evidence, including studies allowing 
for learning, see Brown and Sessions (2004). 
 
Figure 1 Informational feedback in the job market (Spence, 1973, figure 1, pp. 359). 
 
 
 
Spence (1973) gives a dynamic description of how signalling might work in that 
observed labour quality feeds into the value assigned to education signals in the 
labour market. See Figure 2. Over time therefore, the signal is not static but reflects 
recent observations of actual labour productivity by education level. A scenario 
where qualified workers are overpaid relative to their actual productivity can only 
occur under quite restrictive assumptions. The quality of new graduates entering 
the labour force has to be worse than in previous periods and the informational 
feedback sluggish enough not to adjust the wage premium assigned to a particular 
education level based on new observations of productivity. Needless to say, such 
overpayment relative to productivity cannot persist indefinitely. Sooner or later, 
market participants will discover that the quality of new graduate entrants is not 
the same as before and adjust the wage premia assigned to the education signals 
accordingly. 
 
As summarised by Harmon & Walker (2003)19 there are various ways of finessing 
the problem of estimating empirically the extent of signalling in the labour market. 
One of the ways suggested is to compare the wages of the employed and self-
                                                     
19 For a further review of empirical evidence on sorting hypothese see Brown & Sessions (2004). 
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employed20. This is predicated on the assumption that that education has no value 
as a signal for the self-employed as individuals know their own productivity and 
therefore do not need to signal it to themselves. Harmon & Walker (2003) argue, 
based on British Household Panel Survey data, that the rates of return to education 
are quite comparable between the two groups, implying that the signalling 
component is quite small. A weakness of this approach, however, is that self-
employment is not random and that individuals with specific and often 
unobservable characteristics choose to be self-employed. Another approach is to 
directly include ability measures in the regressions. This, however, requires that the 
ability measures are ‘uncontaminated’ by the effects of education or they will pick 
its productivity enhancing effects and that ability measures reflect ability to make 
money rather than ability in an IQ sense. As (Harmon & Walker, 2003, p. 134) point 
out, it “seems unlikely that any ability measure would be able to satisfy both of 
these requirements exactly“. Harmon & Walker (2003, pp. 149-150), conclude that 
it is possible that the returns to education reflect innate ability signalled by 
credentials. However, they find that the effect is small, as the inclusion of ability 
measures lowers the return to schooling by less than one percentage point.  
 
As of yet there is not a widespread consensus on how best to reconcile human 
capital and signalling theories as explanations of graduate wage premia. However, 
most well informed readers of both views will conclude that these are not 
incompatible. Brown & Sessions (2004, p.94) argue that it is a misinterpretation of 
sorting (signalling and screening) that education only signals productivity and 
cannot cause it as such. However, a clear dichotomy is a useful modelling 
expediency. As Brown and Sessions (2004, p.94) point out the "pioneering 
theoretical work of Spence (1973), Arrow (1973) and Stiglitz (1975) only abstracted 
from an augmenting role for education to clarify their analysis". Indeed as Arrow 
(1973) states he did not believe education was unproductive; rather, that this 
assumption was adopted as the extreme view made the modelling process easier. 
Conversely, there is not a basis to reject signalling altogether. The current state of 
the academic debate about the value of education is not about either seeing 
education as productivity enhancing or just a signal, but to narrow the range for 
which education may have a true treatment effect on worker productivity as 
reflected in wages (apart from any wider impacts of course). 
4.3.2 Does education drive earnings or vice-versa? 
The correlation between education and wages has also been scrutinised from a 
more purely empirical point of view. An obvious weakness of the link drawn 
                                                     
20 Some studies compare returns to education in the public and private sectors but these have 
been found less credible. See Harmon & Walker (2003) p. 134. 
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between education and earnings is that it cannot be verified by means of a 
controlled experiment, where randomly selected individuals would be given 
different education treatments and their labour market outcomes subsequently 
compared. Instead we have to rely on analyses of actual observations. Therefore, it 
is not clear ex ante whether the causality runs from education to earnings, or the 
other way around, i.e. individuals with better earning capabilities seek out more 
education. 
 
Various adjustments to the basic analysis of cross-sectional labour market data 
have been used to identify bias in estimates of the rates of return to education. 
These include adjustment for the anticipated growth in earnings, mortality, 
unemployment, taxes and innate ability. Authors of various recent surveys (Checchi 
2006, Psacharopoulos 2004, Bonjour et al 2003, Krueger & Lindhahl 2001) have 
pointed out, following Card (1999), that application of a range of adjustments has 
led to the conclusion that the pluses and minuses effectively cancel so that the end 
result is a net benefit almost equal to the unadjusted one. Therefore the use of 
unadjusted returns has become prevalent. In his survey Checchi (2006) identifies 
three types of weaknesses of the estimated returns to education which could bias 
the results: omitted variables, measurement error and heterogeneity of returns in 
the population. 
 
The case of omitted variables can apply when the researcher is unable to control 
for characteristics that might raise earnings independently of education, such as 
family background or individual ability. “A typical example is unobservable ability: 
more talented persons achieve more education because it is easier for them to do 
so, and at the same time they are more productive when working“ (Checchi, 2006, 
p. 201).  The sign of the bias is ambiguous. It could be positive since more 
intelligent and disciplined people also perform better as students, thus achieving 
longer schooling. However the bias could also be negative if better endowed 
individuals face a higher opportunity cost of schooling and therefore leave 
education earlier. Further ambiguity arises as parents may take decisions on 
educational investment. They may do so on basis of efficiency where more is 
invested in abler individuals, which should produce a positive bias. Conversely, they 
may be driven by equity considerations where more is invested in less able 
individuals to compensate for their shortcomings, resulting in a negative bias.21 
 
Measurement errors are a second source of bias. It has been observed that self- 
reported schooling is not completely accurate and that the measurement errors do 
not cancel out as the least educated cannot underreport and the most educated 
                                                     
21 For details see Checchi (2006) pp. 201-202. 
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cannot over report. “Research in the U.S. over the past three decades has 
concluded that the reliability of self-reported schooling is 85-90 percent (Angrist 
and Krueger (1999, Table 9)), implying that the downward bias is on the order of 
10-15 percent – enough to offset a modest upward ability bias“ (Card, 2001, p. 
1135). 
 
The third source of bias stems from the heterogeneity of the coefficient to be 
estimated in the population. Card (1995) points to two potential sources of the 
heterogeneity – ability bias and cost bias. The first is driven by the fact that 
differences in abilities result in difference in productivity so that more able 
individuals can expect a higher payback for any level of education achieved. The 
second originates from financial market imperfections, where people of different 
family backgrounds face different marginal cost in acquiring education, so that poor 
families face higher cost.  
 
The consequence of both distortions is that the subset of the population with low 
educational attainment will be composed of individuals with lower returns (less 
able) and by individuals facing higher costs (poorer backgrounds). Since the 
underlying model implies that each individual will optimally select the amount of 
education that will equate his/her expected returns to his/her marginal cost, the 
population estimate of the return on education will depend on sub-group 
composition. If the group of less able individuals prevails, I observe a positive 
correlation between education and error component µ in the wage function, and 
therefore the OLS estimate will be upwardly biased. Otherwise when the group of 
individuals from poorer families prevails, the opposite situation will occur, and I 
will observe a downward bias (Checchi, 2006, pp. 202-203). 
 
One way to dealing with this issue is to analyse returns to education in samples of 
twins. As twins share biological and social backgrounds analysing variation within 
twin-pairs controls for the fixed effects of genetics and the home, which is seen as 
(at least partial) controls for individual ability bias. As McMahon (2009, p. 332) 
points out, there is “wide agreement that identical twins studies offer probably the 
best basis for estimating the pure returns to education since they provide highly 
controlled conditions for the identical abilities and family backgrounds of 
monozygotic twins”.  
 
McMahon (2009) summarises US studies utilising within twin-pairs differences in 
earnings and education to estimate ‘net-ability bias’ in estimates of return to 
education. He points out these studies have found evidence of significant ability 
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bias, but that these are partially offset by a downward biased measurement error. 
Early studies found a wide range of estimates for net ability bias but McMahon 
(2009) argues that in more recent studies, with larger samples and methodological 
advancement, estimates have converged on a more narrow range from 0.9% to 
13.7%22. Perhaps the most prominent twin study based on data from UK twins is 
Bonjour et al (2003) who corroborate findings of previous authors that there is 
indeed an upwards ability bias in estimates for returns to education, but that this is 
offset by a downwards bias caused by measurement error. They conclude that 
these roughly cancel out. 
4.4 Skill biased technical change and the return to education over 
time  
In cross sectional comparisons institutional features of the labour market affect 
wage premia. Over time, however, it is not only the relative supply of workers at 
different skill levels (e.g. graduates) that determines wage premia but also demand. 
Demand for skilled labour has been gradually increasing – a fact typically attributed 
to technical change23. Goldin & Katz (2007) use estimates of supply and demand for 
graduate labour to investigate the level of the graduate wage premium in the US 
over the 90 year period from 1915 to 200524. They find that the graduate wage 
premium (vis-á-vis those with high school qualifications) was at a very similar value, 
around 65% at the beginning of the period as the end, albeit with significant 
intermittent fluctuations. Two troughs can be identified, around 1950 when it fell 
close to 30% and again in 1980 when it fell slightly below 40%25.  
 
Figure 2 US College and High School graduate wage premiums 1915 to 2005. Source: Goldin & Katz (2007, 
Figure 1, p. 32).  
 
                                                     
22 These are percentage (not percentage point) deviations so that if a graduate wage premia of say 
50% were to be revised downwards it would become 49.55% (50/1.009) or 43.97% (50/1.137) for 
the lower and upper bounds respectively. 
23 For a review see: Machin (2004) and Acemoglu (2002). 
24 For some metrics they examine an even longer period from 1890 to 2005. 
25 Goldin & Katz (2007) argue that these are not fully explained by the simple supply and demand 
framework, but are influenced by institutional features of the labour market, such as strong 
unionisation in the 1940's and inflation in the 1970's inflation eroding the real value of graduate 
wages relative to lower skilled workers on indexed contracts. Whereas, the growth in the graduate 
wage premium after 1980's was driven by a slowdown in graduate attainment growth and weaker 
bargaining position of lower skilled workers. 
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Acemoglu (2002) reviews evidence and theoretical perspectives on the links 
between technical change and skills premia in the labour market. He draws on 
economic history to argue that technological change can be skill biased (increasing 
the need for skilled labour) but can also be skill replacing (decreasing the need for 
skills). Whereas evidence from the United States in the 20th century suggests that 
technological change has been skill biased, counterexamples are found in 19th 
century Britain where industrialization made highly skilled artisans redundant as 
they were substituted by low skill factory workers. He argues that this dual nature 
of technological change can be understood if it is recognised that the development 
and use of technology responds to profit incentives. In circumstances where it is 
profitable to develop and implement technologies which complement low skill 
workers, technological change will tend to be skill replacing, however when 
technological advances requiring high skill operators are more profitable 
technological change will tend to be skill biased.  
 
I suggest that the early nineteenth century was characterized by skill-replacing 
developments because the increased supply of unskilled workers in the English cities 
(resulting from migration from rural areas and from Ireland) made the introduction 
of these technologies profitable. In contrast, the twentieth century has been 
characterized by skill-biased technical change because the rapid increase in the 
supply of skilled workers has induced the development of skill-complementary 
technologies (Acemoglu, 2002, pp. 9). 
 
Furthermore, Acemoglu (2002) argues that the acceleration of skill biased technical 
change is likely to have been a response to the increased supply of skilled workers, 
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which made skill-intensive production methods more competitive. However, that 
point does not have to imply that the overall rate of technical change has 
increased, but rather that the types of technologies being developed has shifted. 
 
In addition to technical change, wage premia attributed to qualifications have been 
affected by other factors such as changes in labour market structure, i.e. union 
power, changes in firm organisation and increasing trade between high skill and low 
skill countries. McMahon (2009) points out that the rise in the wage premium of 
high-skill workers in the US since 1980 can partially be explained by negative real 
term growth in the wages of unskilled labour. He attributes this fact to a relative 
abundance of unskilled labour, in part due to an effective increase in the supply of 
unskilled labour through increased integration of developing countries in the World 
economy. Furthermore, he suggests that automation has replaced many low-skill 
jobs and therefore reduced the demand for uneducated workers. Acemoglu (2002) 
suggests that all of these factors have amplified the effect of technical change upon 
the graduate wage premium and are likely causes for the real wage decline of low 
skill workers observed in the US. 
 
Historical data reflects the average outcomes of all people with a particular level of 
qualification. More recently, labour market researchers have begun focussing on 
the variability within those averages. Walker & Zhu (2008) point out that at a UK 
level, although the average return to higher education has remained stable the 
distribution has widened with increased participation, where higher ability people 
are earning further beyond the average and lower ability people are falling farther 
behind the average. They argue that this might be the joint effect of increasing 
demand for skilled workers and growing heterogeneity in the HEIs' student intake. 
They argue that strong candidates (high unobserved abilities) are earning a greater 
wage premium than people of similar abilities in previous generations. However, 
the number of graduates with relatively lesser abilities has increased and these 
individuals are earning below average wage premia. Some work argues for falling 
wage premia. See for example McGuinness & Bennet (2005). However, the overall 
effects are modest. 
5 Wider impacts of education 
Most of the academic effort hitherto has focused on the more direct impacts of 
education for the economy; in particular institutional demand-side impacts and 
private returns to education. However, these only constitute a part of the overall 
impact of education for the economy. As outlined in Table 1 each effect within the 
overall impacts can be attributed to one of four quadrangles. So far, only the first 
of these has been discussed, the private market impacts. In this chapter I shall 
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provide a brief overview of the three remaining fields of impact: private non-
market benefits and public benefits — market and non-market.  
 
In relation to the labour market impacts surveyed in the previous chapter, where 
much has been published over several decades, systematic analysis of the wider 
impacts of education is underdeveloped. There is a substantial literature analysing 
specific, often quite narrow, effects. However, this evidence base is fragmented. 
McMahon (2004, 2009 Ch. 4) summarises the relevant existing literature and uses it 
to estimate the economic impact of wider effects of education. Furthermore, 
Haveman & Wolfe (1984) and Oreopolous & Salvanes (2011) provide a review of the 
non-pecuniary impacts of education accruing to individuals. Furthermore, much 
evidence relating to the wider benefits of higher education is summarised in BIS 
(2011, Ch. 3).  
 
McMahon (2004, 2009) argues that the economic contribution of these wider 
impacts can be significant but measurement problems make them difficult to pin 
down. Many of these impacts only reveal themselves with long time lags and there 
is an inherent difficulty in disentangling the impact of education per se from the 
impact of other developments. For example, education increases income and 
socioeconomic advancement, but rising income also has a beneficial impact on 
many socioeconomic metrics. Determining causation is therefore difficult, as is 
attributing outcomes to particular actions or developments. Many of these effects 
are particularly relevant for developing countries, i.e. birth rates, political stability, 
rule of law. But potentially very significant benefits can be reaped by developed 
economies as well, such as through educations' impacts on health and crime rates. 
 
5.1 Private non-market benefits 
Private non-market benefits are the various non-monetary benefits that accrue to a 
particular educated individual. Probably the most important of these is improved 
own health, but a range of effects have been explored in the literature, i.e 
longevity; child health; child education; husband’s health; fertility; happiness; 
consumption and saving; job and location amenities; lifelong learning; consumption 
benefits. For an overview see Oreopoulos & Salvanes (2011) and McMahon (2009, 
ch 4). These effects are strongly correlated with income, which is typically 
controlled for. 
 
A number of studies show statistical association between children’s educational 
attainment and that of their parents. See BIS (2011, Ch. 5) for a summary of some 
of the UK evidence and Wolfe & Haveman (2001) for international summary. What 
mechanism might explain this transmission? It is highly likely that selection issues 
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play a role in the statistics. That is to say that unobservable characteristics that 
facilitate success in education attainment also facilitate success in parenting.  .. 
However, there may be additional transmission channels. For instance Bynner et al. 
(2003) point out that graduate parents read more to their children and own more 
books than non-graduates. Other channels include income, as income is correlated 
with education more higher income can be used to purchase goods and experiences 
that enhance childhood development However, as Oreopolous and Salvanes (2011) 
pont out, conditioning on income does not eliminate these effects. BIS (2011, p. 57) 
concludes that there is “no clear-cut evidence as to what underlies the parenting 
results”. 
 
McMahon (2009) details methods and sources for a range of non-market private 
benefits (including only studies that have income and education in the equation, so 
that income-equivalent benefits can be computed). He estimates that in the case of 
higher education the non-market benefits to the individual are 122% of the 
earnings increase. This is huge, with obvious implications for the incentive for 
individuals to invest in HE provided they have access to the relevant information. 
 
5.2 Public benefits of education 
Education is associated with a number of public benefits. Some are clearly market- 
based and are likely to be picked up in national accounting. Others are non-
pecuniary and likely to impact the economy through much more indirect channels.  
 
Perhaps the most clearly market-based public benefits of education are 
productivity externalities (Heurman 2011, Moretti, 2004, Battu et al 2003). More 
indirectly there are externalities that feed back to economic growth, especially over 
longer time horizons, e.g. effects that arise via more investment in physical capital, 
more investment in education, adoption of technology, improved R&D & innovation 
and slower population (particularly relevant for less developed economies, see 
Kravdal 2002). 
 
Public non-market benefits of education are non-monetary benefits that are 
captured at a social level as an indirect impact of the level of education in the 
community. These are not captured in measures of economic output but may 
improve other development indicators. This category would include education’s 
contributions to various types of social advancement, such as public health 
(Feinstein et al, 2006), strengthening of civic institutions and social engagement 
(Campbell, 2006), lower crime rates (Machin et al, 2011) and environmental effects 
(Appiah & McMahon, 2002). McMahon (2004) lists 13 examples of effects that 
contribute to non-market aspects of economic development (see Table 6.1, pp. 
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218). Many of these are seen as particularly relevant at earlier stages of economic 
development. 
 
There is a small but growing literature on the crime reducing effect of education 
(Haveman and Wolfe, 1984; Lochner and Moretti, 2001; Lochner, 2004; Machin et 
al, 2011). The authors identify several factors that explain the negative relationship 
between the level of education and criminal activity. Firstly, education increases 
opportunity cost of criminal activity by both increasing the returns from legal work 
and increasing the cost of potential incarceration. Secondly, time spent in 
education reduces time available for participation in criminal activity. Thirdly, 
education may reduce the chances of involvement in criminal activity by increasing 
patience and risk aversion. 
 
Machin et al (2011) estimate a causal education impact on crime exploiting as a 
natural experiment the rise in the compulsory school leaving age from 15 to 16 in 
England and Wales in 1972. This law generated a discontinuity in the average age 
left school and proportion with no qualification for men aged 18-40 who were born 
1950-1965 . Simultaneously they observe a drop in the conviction rates for men 
leaving school after the school leaving reform. Similarly, Lochner (2004) finds that 
education reduces criminal behaviour and estimates that the social value of this is 
equivalent to between 14 and 26 percent of the private return to schooling. 
5.3 Overall magnitude of wider impacts 
To estimate the impact of wider benefits of education, cross-country macro 
regressions can be used. However, these are limited in that they include various 
controls for development indicators that are themselves influenced by education 
(i.e. political stability, fixed effect dummies) and therefore pick up some of the 
educational benefits. Furthermore if these include time dummies or are conducted 
over a short time horizon many of the effects will not be picked up as they occur 
with long time lags of at least 10-20 years. These highly controlled regressions 
therefore risk underestimating the wider impacts of education. If these controls are 
relaxed, researchers potentially overstate impacts as education starts to pick up the 
beneficial impacts of other closely related socioeconomic developments. 
Researchers have attempted to engage with this problem by applying different 
specifications, in which each has its potential positive or negative biases. These 
recent studies have provided a range of results which give an indication of the 
plausible magnitude of the wider impacts of education. 
 
McMahon (2004) combines a variety of estimates for the social rate of return to 
education as found in macroeconometric studies and broad findings for private 
rates of return to provide a possible range for the magnitude of the wider impacts 
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of education. Based on recent literature he argues a plausible social rate of return 
of education may vary from approximately 10% to 30%. The lower bound implies 
the returns to education are almost solely based on private market returns with 
limited or no wider impacts. The result is based on tightly controlled static 
regressions, which McMahon (2004) argues fail to attribute wider impacts to 
education, and therefore understate education’s impact. The upper bound is based 
on dynamic, more loosely controlled specifications, which he conversely argues is 
probably overstated as the lack of controls means that the education variable picks 
up effects from other economic developments. Drawing on a number of empirical 
studies and simulations he presents “educated guesses” by economic development 
and education level. 
 
Figure 3 Estimates of social returns to education in the OECD countries. Source: McMahon (2004), Table 
6.5, p. 244.  
 
Conventional monetary 
social rates of return 
(A1+B1) 
Non-market 
private returns 
(A2+B2) 
Non-market education 
externalities (B-3) 
Total social rates of 
return (includes non-
monetary) 
Primary 8.5 6.8 2.5 17.8 
Secondary 9.4 7.5 2.8 19.7 
Higher 8.5 6.8 2.5 17.8 
 
These estimates reveal that the typically un-measured impacts of education are at 
least as big as the frequently estimated private returns to education. However most 
of these wider impacts are in fact non-market benefits accruing to the educated 
individual himself. The externalities, although significant, are relatively small. As for 
education levels their economic impacts seem to be broadly of the same order of 
magnitude, which implies that expansion of education at any level will have a high 
social rate of return26. 
6 Conclusions 
Available evidence on the economic impact of education is broad-brush in nature 
and shaped by the availability of data. Aspects of education that have been tracked 
in large scale secondary data sets, such as labour market outcomes, have been 
thoroughly researched. Much less is known about how particular details shape 
outcomes.  
 
Repeated cross-sectional analysis across the world reveals that formal 
qualifications provide positive wage premia and increase the likelihood of being in 
employment. In the UK each increment of attainment, as captured in the National 
                                                     
26 McMahon (2004) makes similar estimates for developing countries were social returns are 
sometimes twice as large, in particular for primary education. 
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Vocational Qualifications scale, provides a positive benefit on average, although the 
impact of some of these is quite small. 
 
A sizeable literature has grown around how to interpret these cross-sectional 
observations. There is the obvious problem of ability bias that occurs as more gifted 
students self-select into education, thereby inflating perceived wage premia. 
However, there are also counteracting biases through measurement issues and 
cost-bias, which pushes gifted students out of education. Through careful analysis 
of natural experiments and twin-studies a consensus has emerged that 
qualifications  provide a treatment effect and are not simply a reflection of 
selection or a signal of underlying ability. However, several authors have argued 
that around 10-15% of the effect could be spurious. 
 
There is a growing interest in moving beyond such broad aggregate measures and 
look in more depth at different sub-groups. This is particularly urgent as in recent 
years the dispersion of outcomes for highly skilled workers has increased.  
 
There is much less understanding of the magnitude of the wider benefits of 
education, but it is clear that education provides multiple benefits in addition to its 
labour market impact. Education is associated with various non-monetary benefits, 
such as success in marital and family life, happiness, health and longevity. However, 
the private non-market effects are also closely associated with for instance income, 
making the relationship difficult to disentangle. Furthermore, education is 
associated with a number of public benefits, such as innovation, public health and 
reduced crime rates. The challenge is to disentangle the role of education from 
other socioeconomic causes. 
 
The strength of using large scale social surveys to conduct research into the 
economic impact of education is that these can often produce robust results. 
However, as of yet the outputs from such analysis are disappointingly aggregate for 
many policy makers. In the day to day decision the issues are often quite nuanced, 
such as cutting a particular programme to fund another one, or vice versa. There is 
still much work to be done utilising large scale data investments such as 
Understanding Society, but also leveraging a wealth of administrative data. 
However, future policy analysis is most likely to benefit from enhanced efforts to 
collaborate through mixed methods, combining the scaffolding of statistical with 
the rich impression of case studies and observations. 
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